Fail again. Fail better: Nomadic utopianism in Deleuze & Guattari and Yevgeny Zamyatin

David Bell
University of Nottingham

This paper is an encounter between three seemingly disparate bodies of political thought: the co-authored works of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari; Yevgeny Zamyatin’s 1921 novel We and his essays Scythians and On Literature, Energy, Entropy and Other Matters, and works of utopian studies theory. By reading them creatively, it seeks to articulate a philosophy of ‘nomadic utopianism’ which resonates with both Deleuze and Guattari and Zamyatin’s political philosophies and offers an example of the ‘immanent, revolutionary, libertarian utopia[ism]’ Deleuze and Guattari call for in What Is Philosophy? (100). It is hoped that this paper will provide useful insights into all three bodies of work. It offers utopian studies a concept of ‘nomadic utopianism’, which seeks to further the turn away from perfection in recent utopian studies theory, whilst offering a new way of thinking the relationship between utopia (as place) and utopianism (as process). Meanwhile, it explicitly develops the utopianism inherent to Deleuze and Guattari’s work, countering claims that they are anti-utopian (Tormey and Townshend, 2006: 53) - or fleshing out the utopianism that Eugene W. Holland identifies in their work (Holland, 2006). Finally, this paper recasts Yevgeny Zamyatin as a writer with remarkable resonances with Deleuze and Guattari’s works and thus as an author who has much to say to the world of contemporary political philosophy - not least through the nomadic utopianism I identify in his work, something which challenges traditional readings of him as an anti-utopian author (Hillegas, 1967; Hoyles, 1991; 87; Berneri, 1950: 226).
Structure

This paper opens with my reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s co-authored philosophy (although I also draw occasionally on Deleuze’s solo writing), which I argue constitutes an ‘inorganic vitalism’: a materialist process philosophy committed to immanence and suspicious of idealist and rationalist philosophies. Noting that Deleuze and Guattari label thought such as theirs ‘nomadic’ and position it against the ‘State’ thought inherent to the majority of western philosophy, I unpack my reading, developing an account of Deleuze and Guattari’s numerous neologisms along the way. These, I note, frequently form pairs—although I move on to argue that they cannot be read as binary opposites, but repeatedly flow into each other.

I then turn to the philosophy Yevgeny Zamyatin put forth in two short essays (Scythians and On Literature, Revolution, Entropy and Other Matters). This, I argue, also constitutes nomadic thought and bares a remarkable similarity to Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy. I develop my reading of Zamyatin’s philosophy and highlight resonances with the thought of Deleuze and Guattari. I note that they both call for a ‘utopianism’, and use this as a springboard from which to develop nomadic utopianism.

Before this can be done, however, I offer a reading of utopian studies theory in which I argue that there are two traditions of utopianism - one orientated towards freedom, the other towards authoritarianism. Through encounters with the thought of Deleuze and Guattari, I develop these two traditions into my theories of ‘State Utopainism’ and ‘nomadic utopianism’.

Indeed, upon discussing the similarities with a colleague she remarked that surely Deleuze and Guattari must have read - and been inspired by - Yevgeny Zamyatin. Given Deleuze and Guattari’s frequent acknowledgement of a wide range of sources this seems unlikely.
I then develop my reading of State Utopianism. I show it to be a philosophy driven by a transcendent signifier located in an abstract space beyond the present world which seeks to close off spaces for life in the name of perfection. I note that such a philosophy is ultimately anti-utopian, for it posits that there can be no progression beyond the perfect. In order to provide a fictive example to flesh out the concept of State Utopianism and the issues discussed in this section I present my reading of OneState- the setting of *We* as a State Utopia.

I then develop my concept of nomadic utopianism by focusing on resonances between the tradition of utopianism orientated around freedom - as found in the works of Ben Anderson (2006), Tom Moylan (2000), Lucy Sargisson (1994) - and the nomadic thought of Deleuze and Guattari and Zamyatin. Here I note that the emphasis on perfection is abandoned and a turn towards an immanent philosophy is enacted. I develop my concept of the ‘metonymy of utopia’ in which a utopia ceases to be utopian as soon as it is realised, necessitating further processes of change. I then consider whether a philosophy of becoming can be called utopian (for utopia, if it is to be understood as a static state of being would be hostile to such a philosophy), suggesting that Deleuze and Guattari’s work on the relationship between a producer and their product is instructive here and suggests that yes, such thought can be conceived of as utopian, whilst offering a new way of considering the relationship between place and process in utopian studies. Finally, I offer the Mephi resistance movement in *We* as an example of a nomadic utopianism.

**Nomadic Thought #1: Deleuze and Guattari’s Inorganic Vitalism**

For Deleuze and Guattari, the history of western philosophy is constructed on the transcendence of the idea and the self-unification of the subject via the theory of the
Cogito. They present this philosophy as a philosophy hostile to life\(^4\), which creates societies who see themselves as the telos of mankind: a final state of being in which no further becoming is necessary (Deleuze, 1983: 141). In *A Thousand Plateaus*, they refer to such thought as ‘state philosophy’- going beyond the idea of a state as a solely geopolitical entity to a body of thought that - as Saul Newman notes - encompasses ‘most political philosophy’ (2007: 99).

Against this, they develop their nomadic thought, inspired by an ‘orphan-line of thinkers…united in their opposition to the State philosophy’ who provide a ‘secret link constituted by the critique of negativity, the cultivation of joy, the hatred of interiority, the exteriority of forces and relations, the denunciation of power’ (Deleuze, quoted in Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: x). Such thought resists the orientation to finality found in state philosophy, instead harnessing ‘forces’\(^5\) to open new spaces for life.

This thought, I wish to suggest - is both materialist and vitalist. This appears counter-intuitive for classical philosophy, yet for Deleuze and Guattari, life is a material force that may be ‘diverted’ into organic beings, but maintains a singularity quite apart from its appropriation in animal or human form. Indeed, they state that organisms often seek to ‘confine’ life, as the following passage from *A Thousand Plateaus* makes clear:

> [Life is a] streaming, spiralling, zigzagging, snaking, feverish line of variation [that] liberates a power of life that human beings had rectified and organisms had confined, and which matter now expresses as the trait, flow or impulse traversing it. If everything is alive, it is not because everything is organic or

\(^4\) One thinks here of Socrates’ announcement in Plato’s *Phaedo* that ‘all of philosophy is training for death’ (Plato: 1925, online at perseus.tufts.edu), although I avoid use of the term ‘death’ to refer to the organisation of life in State thought: death is not the ‘opposite’ of life (nor its termination) for Deleuze and Guattari. Indeed, through his reading of the eternal return death is, rather, a potentially productive source of the new. For Deleuze, hostility to life comes via the *containment* of its flows (see Baugh in Parr, 2005, 61-62).

\(^5\) This concept of force as ‘power to’ owes a lot to Deleuze’s readings of Spinoza (1990) and Nietzsche (1983).
organized, but, on the contrary, because the organism is a diversion of life. In short the life in question is *inorganic*, germinal, and intensive, a powerful life without organs, a body that is all the more alive for having no organs (501-emphasis added).

Life, then, is a force that creates the new by ‘variation’. It produces a sensation that Deleuze refers to as ‘complete power, complete bliss [and is]…no longer dependent on a Being or submitted to an Act - it is an absolute immediate consciousness whose very activity no longer refers to a being but is ceaselessly posed in a life’ (Deleuze, 2001: 27). The task of nomadic thought is to work in unity with this life force, although this is necessarily ‘a complex unity: one step for life, one step for thought. Modes of life [inspire] ways of thinking; modes of thinking create ways of living. Life *activates* thought, and thought in turn *affirms* life’ (Deleuze, 2001: 66)\(^6\). This is a unity unobtainable for idealist philosophy which argues that change comes from a transcendent ideal posited in a place beyond the present.

Thus, for Deleuze and Guattari, the only way philosophy can stay true to life is to proceed immanently - the potential to go beyond the present is to be found within the present itself (the material, inorganic forces of life). This is perhaps most clearly expressed in Deleuze’s essay *Immanence: A Life*: ‘We will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing else. It is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is nothing is itself a life….. It is complete power, complete bliss…no longer dependent on a Being or submitted to an Act - it is an absolute immediate consciousness whose very activity no longer refers to a being but is ceaselessly posed in a life’ (2001: 27).

\(^6\) In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari claim that vitalism has been ‘shattered’ (313). Yet the vitalism they are here referring to is the organic variety which insists on the ‘specific or personal unity of the organism’ (ibid.). Deleuze’s claim that ‘everything I’ve written is vitalistic’ (1995: 143) must therefore be taken as referring to the inorganic, materialist variety I have outlined here.
If immanence is life, then the transcendent, as a higher power to which life must orientate itself, must be seen as hostile to life. Yet to understand what Deleuze and Guattari mean by immanence and transcendence one must turn to *What Is Philosophy?* where they state: ‘Immanence is immanent only to itself and consequently captures everything, absorbs All-One, and leaves nothing remaining to which it could be immanent. In any case, whenever immanence is interpreted as immanent to Something, we can be sure that this Something reintroduces the transcendent’ (45).

Life, as immanence, is a state of pure becoming - opposed to static being, for ‘all that is necessary [for a philosophy of the transcendent to establish itself] is for movement to be stopped. Transcendence enters as soon as movement of the infinite is stopped’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 47). Life - as a state of becoming - is an eternal force that cannot be organized according to supposed ‘higher’ principles but must be allowed to flow freely and as its own end. It is a mistake to think that ‘a line [of becoming] goes from one point to another’ and posit the ‘submission of the line to the point’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 323), for ‘a line of becoming is not defined by points that it connects, or by points that compose it; on the contrary, it passes between points…a line of becoming has neither beginning nor end, departure nor arrival, origin nor destination’(ibid.). It is only by ‘becoming’ that we can bring the new into being, something Jameson is aware of when he states that ‘if you know already what your longed-for exercise in a not-yet existent freedom looks like, then the suspicion arises that it may not really express freedom after all but only repetition’

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7 It would be a worthwhile task to undertake a reflection on the nature of infinity being employed by Deleuze here, especially in relation to recent theological debates. Derrida’s concept of religion as a radical openness in *The Gift of Death* (1996) and Martin Hagglund’s concept of ‘infinite finitude’ - which states that ‘to be finite, then, is not to be oriented toward one’s end but to postpone that end - to send oneself beyond oneself in order to remain’ (2008: 192) - would both appear to have potentially interesting uses for the theory I am advancing here. Many thanks to Alex Andrews and this article’s anonymous reviewer for stimulating thought about these potential areas of resonance.
(1994: 56). Any ideal posited beyond the present serves as a transcendent point which removes immanent life of its power to produce the new.

In the psychoanalytic language of *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari take influence from Lacan and posit ‘desire’ as the essence of becoming. Yet where desire is traditionally considered as a subordinate product of lack (the subject desires what it lacks), Deleuze and Guattari are adamant that ‘desire does not lack anything; it does not lack its object’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 28). Rather, it is an immanent essence, a ‘process of production without reference to any exterior agency’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 170-171) - without reference to a transcendent ideal: ‘Clement Rosset puts it very well: every time the emphasis is put on a lack that desire supposedly suffers from as a way of defining its object, “the world acquires as its double some other sort of world…there exists some other place that contains the key to desire (missing in this world)”’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 28).

Desire is therefore an eternal force of becoming: it does not cease with the realization of a ‘lack’. Rather, it creates its own lack and - once this lack is fulfilled starts the whole process again: ‘everything stops dead for a moment, everything freezes in place - and then the whole process will begin over again’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 8). Eugene W.Holland likens this to Lacan’s metonymy of desire, in which a desired object loses its desirable qualities as soon as it is realized (in Stivale, 2005: 61).

Deleuze and Guattari also identify transcendence in the classical rational subject, arguing that ‘common sense, the unity of all the faculties at the centre of the Cogito, is the State consensus raised to the absolute’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 376). It
constitutes an attempt to ‘ground’ desire - or life - in a single, rational ‘being’. Such a being, according to Deleuze and Guattari, will be unable to think the new, for active forces escape consciousness (Deleuze, 1983: 41). Against this, they offer the ‘schizophrenic’: a subject traversed by a multiplicity of active forces, who cannot ‘think’ change (or posit it transcendentally), but who ‘knows’ it immanently, is ‘as close as possible to matter, to a burning, living center of matter…that unbearable point where the mind touches matter and lives its every intensity, consumes it’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 21). It is this ‘schizo-revolutionary (…) who is the universal producer’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 7) of nomadic thought – not the rational subject of the Cogito.

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari develop their nomadic thought further with the concept of the ‘nomadic war machine’. This is a vehicle (or ‘assemblage’ or relation of forces) of becoming entirely immanent to itself which ‘in no way has war as its object, but rather the emission of quanta of deterritorialization, the passage of mutant flows (in this sense, every new creation is brought about by a war machine). There are many reasons to believe that the war machine is of a different origin, is a different assemblage, than the State apparatus. It is of nomadic origin and is directed against the State apparatus’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 253).

Although Deleuze and Guattari make no mention of anarchism in their work, the nomadic war machine is clearly an anarchistic concept operating ‘against State apparatus’ which form an almost religious entity that dominates its citizens (Newman, 2007: 99). Yet as Newman makes clear - and as I note above- the state in Deleuze and Guattari refers not just to a geopolitical entity but to the ‘abstract state’-

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8 Lewis Call explains this clearly, stating that rational subjectivity is impossible as a platform for action because we cannot ‘recognise and control’ forces that act upon us (1994: 80). The schizophrenic, however, ‘feels’ these forces and is able to translate them into radical political action.
a set of principles, values and norms whose aim is to ‘conserve’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 394) and thus to halt immanent life-flows. As Newman notes: ‘according to this analysis, most political philosophy - including even anarchism - based on a rational critique of the state and a Manichean division between ‘rational’ society and ‘irrational’ power, would be considered state philosophy. It leaves the place of state power intact by subjecting revolutionary action to rational injunctions that channel it into state forms’ (2007: 99).

Nomadic thought and its partner in practice - the nomadic war machine - is an attempt to escape this double-bind: it maps irrational ‘lines of flight’ and flees from rationally constructed transcendent schemas, creating what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as ‘smooth space’: a ‘nomadic’ space which is ‘occupied without being counted’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 399) and in which ‘movement is not from one point to another, but becomes perpetual, without aim or destination, without departure or arrival’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 389). Smooth space is ‘heterogenous, in continuous variation…amorphous and not homogenous’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 536). It is filled with ‘multiplicity which changes in nature when it divides’ (ibid.: 534), thus creating new arrangements of forces; new possibilities for life. This stands in contrast to striated space - an arrangement in which life is organized according to hierarchical, transcendent principles: a ‘Euclidean space’9 in which linkages are defined and can only be effected in one way (ibid.: 535-6).

So far I have identified and explained a small number of Deleuze and Guattari’s neologistic concepts. The attentive reader will have noted that these usually come in

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9 In Euclidean geometry a large number of theorems are premised on just five axioms and a line is formed only between two points. It is thus a ‘containing’ philosophy of which Deleuze and Guattari are highly critical (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 233) and, for a discussion of ‘State geometry’ without direct mention of Euclid, see (ibid.: 409).
pairs - smooth and striated space; the immanent and the transcendent and, of course, the state and the nomad. I have tried to show how one of these concepts is linked to the life and the opening of new spaces for life whilst the other seeks to close off possibilities for new ways of being. It would be easy, therefore, to argue that Deleuze and Guattari have created a binary system of the kind they purport to despise: yet that would miss a crucial aspect of their theory. For these conceptual pairs concepts do not function as binary opposites. Rather - and here I will introduce a further Deleuzeo-Guattarian neologic pair- they ‘deterritorialize’ and ‘reterritorialize’ into one another. These terms vary in meaning across Deleuze and Guattari’s works, but I will be following Adrian Parr in stating that ‘to deterritorialize is to free up the fixed relations that contain a body all the while exposing it to new organisations’ (in Parr, 2005: 67). Nomadic thought is a deterritorializing force - smoothing over the striated spaces created by state thought, but state thought is able to immediately reterritorialize and striate the newly created smooth space. Simon Tormey and Jules Townshend liken this to Sartre’s concept of the ‘practicoinert’: the moment when revolutionary ideals become victorious and ossify into established norms, closing off opportunities for future change (2006: 45).

Hence, although Deleuze and Guattari argue that life is an immanent process, they acknowledge that the genuinely new is only created in the fluctuation between the immanent and the transcendent (in the sense of interruption of the infinite). Nomadic ‘escapes and movements would be nothing if they did not return to molar organizations’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 239- emphasis added), whilst ‘smooth space is constantly being translated, transformed into a striated space; striated space is constantly being reversed, returned to a smooth space’ (ibid.: 524). A purely smooth space traversed solely by desire, warn Deleuze and Guattari, would be a site
of total nonproduction, and although smooth space is a crucial aspect of nomadic thought it does not constitute a perfect utopia. Indeed, Steven Shaviro reads Angela Carter’s *The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman* as a novel providing a dystopian example of such a state, in which the narrator becomes so overwhelmed with the constant movement of the infinite that his only desire is that everything stop (Shaviro, 2009: 123).

Thus, what interests Deleuze and Guattari is how immanence reverts to transcendence; smoothness reverts to striation; how what is deterritorialized becomes reterritorialized and how these changes create the new, how this newness becomes ossified, organized, calcified and stops the ‘movement of the infinite’ before deterritorializing again. Their inorganic vitalism aims to open up new spaces for the play of life, but they explicitly acknowledge that this can only be done when death is inserted into the process (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 9). ‘Everything stops dead for a moment, everything freezes in place - and then the whole process will begin all over again’: a politics of radical pessimism, perhaps best summed up by a mantra from Samuel Beckett’s *Worstward Ho!*: ‘Fail again. Fail better’ (1984: 7)\(^\text{10}\).

**Nomadic Philosophy #2: Yevgeny Zamyatin**

Having developed my interpretation of Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘nomadic’ thought, I now wish to highlight remarkable resonances with the philosophy of Yevgeny Zamyatin, as espoused in two short essays - *Scythians* and *On Literature, Revolution, Entropy, and Other Matters*.

Although there is no evidence to suggest that either Deleuze or Guattari was aware of Yevgeny Zamyatin’s writing, it is likely they would have seen in him a kindred

\(^{10}\) In my more optimistic (and less academic) moments, I am drawn by Buzz Lightyear's catchphrase: ‘to infinity and beyond!’.
nomadic spirit - a fact all the more incredible given that *Scythians* was written in 1918 and *On Literature, Revolution, Entropy and Other Matters* in 1923 - in the case of the former over fifty years before the original French publication of *Anti-Oedipus* - Deleuze and Guattari’s first collaboration - in 1972.

In both of these essays Zamyatin argues for a politics of permanent revolution, with revolution fulfilling a similar function to the material, inorganic forces of life in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy - it is a force which is ‘everywhere, in everything. It is infinite. There is no final revolution, no final number’ (OL: 107) - no transcendent ‘lack’ to which it pays deference. Like Deleuze and Guattari’s lines of becoming, the revolution is not submitted to a ‘point’, but stretches into eternity, and so Zamyatin warns that the revolutionary ‘can never rest on laurels, he will never be with the practical victors, with those who rejoice and sing “Glory be”’ (1991b: 23) - when transcendence enters and stops movement of the infinite, he will ‘hasten away...to freedom’ (ibid.: 22). Zamyatin, like Deleuze and Guattari, must be read as an inorganic vitalist, with ‘revolution’ the force of life. In *On Literature, Revolution, Entropy and Other matters* he introduces his concepts of energy and entropy, which I read as referring to life and ‘the negation of life’: entropy being associated with the ‘heat death of the universe’ via the second law of thermodynamic theory, which can be interpreted as stating that: ‘the entropy of a closed system tends towards a maximum and that its available energy tends towards a minimum’.

Zamyatin also argues that revolutionary thought opens up ‘non-Euclidean spaces’, recalling Deleuze and Guattari’s claim that smooth space is non-Euclidean, whilst his

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11 I take this formulation from Pamela Zoline’s extraordinary short story *The Heat Death of the Universe*, which weaves the tale of a woman tied to housework (her house thus constituting a striated space) with the heat death of the universe: making a connection between her inability to join any lines of ‘becoming’ and the end of the universe. Here, an inability to ‘become’ is inextricably linked to the cessation of life (Zoline, 2006).
praise for Lobachevsky (Zamyatin, 1991a: 107) resonates with the inspiration Deleuze and Guattari draw from Riemann (2004b: 157, 532-33). Like Deleuze and Guattari, Zamyatin presents his smooth space presented as a nomadic territory (the Mongolian steppe is used in both cases) and the revolutionary as a nomad who:

gallops across the green steppe, hair streaming in the wind. Where is he galloping? Nowhere. What for? For no reason. He simply gallops because he is a Scythian... an eternal nomad. Today he is here, tomorrow, there. Being attached to one place is unbearable to him. And if in his wild gallop he should chance upon a fenced town, he will give it a wide detour. The very odor of a dwelling, of settled existence... is intolerable to the Scythian. He is alive only in the wind, free gallop, only in the open steppe (Zamyatin, 1991b: 21).

Zamyatin, then, posits the nomad as the central figure of resistance to state thought – a figure who knows that to gallop is to remain immanent to immanence, to trace a 'line of flight'. Thus, they will do so ‘under any regime, any external order’ (ibid.: 32) because - as Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadic war machine exists outside the state, so too must the revolutionary for, ‘at all times, under the laws of all the monarchies and republics ... [revolutionaries] been rewarded only by a lodging at government expense - prison’ (Zamyatin, 1991a: 23). Here, we see clear echoes of the elements of (post)anarchism Saul Newman identifies in Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the nomadic war machine.

There is one further point of resonance between the philosophies of Deleuze and Guattari and Zamyatin which I wish to highlight, and it is this resonance that serves a springboard for the remainder of this paper. Perhaps surprisingly to those with only a colloquial understanding of the term, both make mention of utopianism in relation to their thought. Zamyatin refers to the task of the nomadic revolutionary as a ‘utopian’ one, acting in the present for the future (Zamyatin, 1991a : 109), whilst in What Is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari argue that:

12 Both Riemann and Lobachecsky challenged Euclidean geometrical theories.
utopia is what links philosophy with its own epoch...it is with utopia that philosophy becomes political and takes the criticism of its own time to its highest point. Utopia does not split off from infinite movement: etymologically it stands for absolute deterritorialization but always at the critical point at which it is connected with the present relative milieu, and especially with the forces stifled by this milieu. Erewhon, the word used by Samuel Butler, refers not only to no-where but also to now-here. What matters ... [are] the different types of utopia, one of them being revolution. In utopia (as in philosophy), there is always the risk of restoration, and sometimes a proud affirmation, of transcendence, so that we need to distinguish between authoritarian utopias, or utopias of transcendence, and immanent, revolutionary, libertarian utopias. But to say that revolution is itself utopia of immanence is not to say that it is a dream, something that is not realized or that is only realized by betraying itself. On the contrary, it is to posit revolution as plane of immanence, infinite movement and absolute survey but to the extent that these features connect up with what is real here and now... relaunching new struggles whenever the earlier one is betrayed. The word utopia therefore designates that conjunction of philosophy, or of the concept, with the present milieu- political philosophy (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 100).

The Two Utopian Traditions

In Journey Through Utopia, Marie Louise Berneri writes that:

two main trends manifest themselves in utopian thought throughout the ages. One seeks the happiness of mankind through material well-being, the sinking of man’s individuality into the group, and the greatness of the State. The other, while demanding a certain degree of material comfort, considers that happiness is the result of the free expression of man’s personality and must not be sacrificed to an arbitrary moral code or to the interests of the state (1950: 2).

Whilst happiness is perhaps not the best measure of utopias, the distinction is a worthwhile one. Indeed, the dividing of utopianism into two trends, strands or traditions - one orientated around freedom, the other around order - is a common one in a variety of utopian studies theory. Ernst Bloch undertakes a similar task in the second volume of The Principle of Hope (1986, 626-640) whilst - inspired by Zamyatin - Le Guin develops concepts of ‘euclidean’ (totalitarian utopianism) and ‘non-euclidean’ utopianism (oriented towards freedom) (1989: 85-90). In this section
I will provide an overview of the characteristics of each tradition\textsuperscript{13}, noting their relation to anti-utopianism and dystopianism.

Before such a task can be begun, however, a point of clarification regarding my methodology of textual analysis must be undertaken. As Tony Burns notes, utopian studies theorists traditionally adhere to the principles of authorial intentionalism (2008: 143)\textsuperscript{14}. According to these principles, the issue of whether a text is utopian, dystopian or anti-utopian is decided in reference to the author’s intentions. Such an approach is problematic, as Moylan (who nevertheless uses it) acknowledges:

\begin{quote}

some texts intended (and internally marked) as utopian or dystopian (or perhaps not written within a utopian/dystopian strategy at all) can be received by readers as utopian or dystopian according to their own aesthetic and political judgments. Skinner’s \textit{Walden Two} is thus a utopia often read as a dystopia, and I recall a graduate professor of mine saying that he considered Delany’s critical utopia, \textit{Triton}, to be nothing but utopian or even anti-utopian (Moylan, 2000: 155).
\end{quote}

Given these constraints, I choose to abandon authorial intentionalism when considering the nature of a text - an approach also adopted by Sargisson (1994: 34). Following Sargisson again (9-62), I argue that utopias must be defined in reference to function of their text, as opposed to their form or content. There is no universal ‘utopian’ forms - novels, buildings, schools, cities; supranational organisations - are all sites for utopianism. Defining a utopia by reference to its content, meanwhile, is an extremely difficult - if not impossible - task, as one utopian experiment may share no formal characteristics with another: one may be a tract describing a perfect society, another may be a co-operative which allows the distribution of goods via a gift economy. Indeed, to use either a form or content based approach may blind us

\textsuperscript{13} These will, of course, be grossly oversimplified, but it would be impossible to do justice to the plurality of thought each tradition contains in such a short space. Despite this issue, I still believe the distinction between the two trends is worthwhile.

\textsuperscript{14} Burns cites Levitas, Sargent, Moylan and Walsh as utopian theorists who subscribe to authorial intentionalism (although they note its problems).
to the arrival of a utopianism in a hitherto unrecognised form or with previously unrecognised goals\textsuperscript{15}. A function based argument, however - which interrogates what a text is \textit{trying} to do - or rather what it is \textit{capable}\textsuperscript{16} of doing, allows one to determine whether the text in question is utopian; and if so to which tradition it belongs.

It is of authoritarian utopianism to which colloquial references to utopia relate (Sargent, 1994: 2; Levitas, 1990: 8). To an extent, this is a straw philosophy - drawn up by opponents of utopia including Karl Popper (2003) and Ralph Dahrendorf (1958) and satirised to devastating effect in George Orwell's \textit{Nineteen Eightyfour} and Yevgeny Zamyatin's \textit{We} (among others), yet it also an argument put forth by Krishnan Kumar (1987) and J.C. Davis (1981) - two scholars of utopianism sympathetic to their subject, whilst B.F. Skinner's \textit{Walden Two} (2005) depicts such a utopia fictionally.

Authoritarian utopianism is driven by a desire for perfection (Davis, 1981: 14; Berneri, 1950: 2). Utopia is conceived of as a static state of perfected being, whilst utopianism constitutes attempts to realise this state - a movement from blueprint to perfection. These blueprints are drawn up according to rationally constructed plans that appeal to abstract principles (Davis, 1981: 102, Popper, 2003: 154, Berneri, 1950: 5) - the application of which, it is hoped, will end result in perfection.

Achieving and maintaining these states of perfection requires strong - even totalitarian - authority, something Davis makes abundantly clear: ‘the perfection of utopias must be total and ordered; the totality, ordered and perfect. In order to

\textsuperscript{15}Here there are similarities with Wittgenstein's claim in \textit{Philosophical Investigations} that our presumptions about the meaning of a word dictate our abilities to apply that word (2001: 66).

\textsuperscript{16}Capable because the text may have consequences unintended or unimagined by those who create the text. The point is to interrogate the text and tease out any inherent utopian latencies.
achieve this, without denying the nature of man or society, there must be discipline of a totalitarian kind’ (1981: 39) - an argument supported (from a critical stance) by Popper (2003) and Berneri (1950: 7). This totalitarianism must extend to the psychological sphere too, for the ability of the individual to think alternatives, let alone attempt to realise them, represents a challenge to perfection (Davis, 1981: 54, 374) - utopia is ‘static and does not allow its citizens to fight or even to dream of a better utopia’ (Berneri, 1950: 7). Hence we find Davis arguing that ‘utopia’s greatest enemy is pluralism’ (1981: 382).

Such a philosophy is necessarily statist: a large state apparatus being necessary in order to achieve the levels of control required. Davis calls this the ‘Leviathan state’ – a:

centralised, bureaucratic, sovereign state with its impersonal, institutional apparatus… [a] comprehensive, collective state with its assumption of obligations in every area of human life, from health to employment, education to transport, defence to entertainment and leisure… a total and rational social order, of uniformity instead of diversity, of impersonal, neutrally functioning bureaucracy and of the comprehensive, the total state (1981: 8-9).

He even goes so far as to suggest that utopianism is worth studying primarily because it was influential in the development of the modern state (1981: 9).

The philosophy of authoritarian utopianism is, perhaps, archetypal of Adorno and Horkheimer’s argument in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1997) that enlightenment is secularised myth. No longer do we have to wait until death to ascend to heaven and experience a perfected state of being (as in Augustine’s *City of God*): we can build it on earth. Following in this logic, Kumar likens the utopian position to Pelagianism - a branch of Christianity which states that mankind is born without original sin and is thus perfectible (1987: 124). Against this, he argues that anti-utopians adopt an Augustinian outlook and believe that mankind is possessed with original sin, thus
negating the possibility of achieving a final state of perfection (ibid.). Kumar then argues that the Augustinian Anti-Utopian must be a conservative thinker, offering an either/or choice between Utopian and Anti-Utopian; radical and conservative (127). From the perspective of nomadic thought, authoritarian utopianism is a philosophy hostile to life. It is grounded in rationalism and transcendence: an example of state philosophy par excellence. It is thus unable to think the genuinely new, incapable of conceiving of difference-in-itself and hostile to immanent flows of life: a state philosophy - State Utopianism.

State utopias show themselves to be unable to think freedom and difference, expressing only ‘repetition’ - the values of their time projected forwards in time (Jameson, 1994: 62) They submit immanence to the laws of the transcendent, with Utopia taking the form of this ‘something’ or ‘lack’ - a point of being to which all flows of becoming are directed. Utopia thus becomes what Rosset refers to (in the quote from Anti-Oedipus above) as the world’s double – ‘some other place that contains the key to desire (missing in this world)’.

It is for this reason that Deleuze and Guattari and Zamyatin are often presented as Anti-Utopian thinkers. Yet I would contend that this is a hurried assumption. Their positing of desire as the human essence demanding change may mean that they reject the ‘Pelagian’ belief that mankind is perfectible, but their nomadic thought

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17 Kumar does acknowledge a second variety of anti-utopianism born of an ontology which sees human nature demanding a constant state of becoming (1987: 102), arguing that such for such thinkers a state of perfection ‘would violate the restlessness and striving that are an essential part of the human spirit’ (1987: 103) and accepting that there is ‘at least as much of the utopian as the anti-utopian temperament in their make-up’ (ibid.). However, he does not follow through this claim to imagine what the utopianism of the radical anti-utopian might look like, resorting to the binary thinking described in the main body of my text.

18 There is a neat etymological similarity to H.G. Well’s concept of ‘static utopianism’ (1905: adelaide.edu). Following Deleuze and Guattari, it must be noted that a State Utopia does not refer solely to Utopias set in states- a statist mindset can persist even in anarchist societies.
refuses the acceptance of any status quo, suggesting a problem with the binary of utopianism/anti-utopianism posited by Kumar.

Indeed, from a nomadic perspective this binary choice between State Utopianism and anti-utopianism collapses into a death oriented double-bind. Following Deleuze and Guattari’s claim that transcendence enters ‘as soon as movement of the infinite is stopped’, the conclusions of anti-utopians must themselves be considered as examples of a State Utopian mindset. Claims such as Karl Popper’s assertion that only ‘piecemeal politics’ within a liberal democratic framework are acceptable forms of change (2003) and Frances Fukuyama’s claim that liberal democratic capitalism represents ‘the end of history’ (1992) all express the belief that the western world - in its current form - is as close to perfection as it will ever get; infinity has found its final resting place. As Davis once noted, ‘there is no longer [a] need for politics in utopia’ (Davis, 1984: 10). Anti-Utopians are merely those who believe we are living in the good place.

**State Utopianism in Yevgeny Zamyatin's We**

Written in 1920-21, *We* takes the form of the diary of D-503, an engineer in a city state called OneState. Although often taken to a be an explicit satire on Leninism and the USSR, OneState draws on trends inherent to early Soviet communism, British eccentricity and the mass-production of US capitalism. To this one must add Plato’s *Republic* - referenced by OneState’s city state form, the presence of ‘the

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19 He was, of course, referring to what I have called ‘State Utopianism’.

20 I am not the first to note this contradiction. Lyman Tower Sargent notes that ‘the conservative opponent of reform is… a utopian. In arguing that we cannot or should not attempt to improve on the present, she or he is saying either that we live in the best possible world or that any change is likely to make our imperfect world even more imperfect’ (1982: 580), whilst Anderson argues that designating a ‘fixed, closed end point’ is anti-utopian (2006: 696).
guardians’ who police and govern life in OneState and the execution of a poet in the novel.21

Here, I wish to argue that OneState provides us with a fictional example of a realised state-utopia. It constitutes a striated space with the aim of ‘hardening and crystallizing life’ to achieve an ‘ideal…state of affairs where nothing ever happens anymore’ (Zamyatin, 1993: 25): a state in which the flow of the infinite has been cut off by transcendence and in which a ‘lack’ has supposedly cured desire once and for all.

Nothing need happen, D-503 suggests, because of the ‘mathematically perfect life of OneState’ (Zamyatin, 1993: 4) - a ‘system of scientific ethics… based on subtraction, addition, division and multiplication’ (ibid.: 14). The principles of Euclid hold sway and the city constitutes an enormous striated space, bringing to mind Deleuze and Guattari’s claim that ‘the city is the striated space par excellence’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 531). OneState, we are told, ‘is a straight line. The great, divine, precise, wise straight line - the wisest of all lines’ (Zamyatin, 1993: 4), which defines the activities of and relationships between its ‘numbers’: a ‘table of hours’ allotting set times for work, walks, sleeping - and sex (with numbers allotted a sexual partner by the state bureaucracy).

Human life has been stripped to that which is rational, with D-503 displaying almost autistic22 inability to contemplate behaviour that is not mathematically calculated. The idea of freedom terrifies him:

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21 Plato’s Republic is frequently cited as - if not the original then certainly a very early - authoritarian utopia (Bemeri, 1950: 8; Popper, 2003: 48).
22 One could make a strong case for arguing that D-503 displays a number of autistic traits in We. He states that he ‘can’t make jokes [as] the default value of every joke is a lie’ (14); improbable coincidences trouble him greatly (16) and he is troubled when he (unintentionally) tells a lie (32) (many
I've read and heard a lot of unbelievable stuff about those times when people lived in freedom… of all things the very hardest for me to believe was how the governmental power of that time… could have permitted people to live without even a semblance of our Table, without obligatory walks, without precisely established mealtimes, getting up and going to bed whenever it pleased them… Now, that's something I simply cannot get through my head (63).

D-503’s inability to comprehend of a smooth, nomadic space (or even a less striated space) supports Deleuze and Guattari’s insistence that state thought extends beyond the state as it is traditionally defined - embedding itself in the psyche of citizens.

Furthermore, the state functions as an almost religious entity: D-503 describing it as possessing ‘divine power’ (Zamyatin, 1993: 45), whilst a ‘justice ceremony’ (an execution) is described as ‘a sacrifice to our God, OneState’ (ibid.: 45), and has ‘something of the old religions’ about it (ibid: 49). OneState’s ‘Guardians’, meanwhile, are compared to ‘Guardian angels’ (ibid.: 49- translation modified23) whilst the Benefactor - OneState’s ruler- stands in for God in OneState’s linguistic system: ‘Great Benefactor!’ and ‘Listen, in the name of the Benefactor’ are both used by Numbers to convey urgency (ibid.: 102, 150). The Pelagian worldview is vindicated: heaven has been built on earth24.

more examples of autistic-like behaviour from D-503 can be found throughout the text). Given my note below that the ‘schizophrenic’ subject of nomadic utopianism is (culturally) female, it is perhaps worth considering claims that autism is often seen as a culturally masculine trait. Furthermore, Deleuze and Guattari refer to de-revolutionised schizophrenics as ‘autistic rags’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 21) who - like D-503 - blindly accept that given truths are fixed for eternity. Perhaps nomadic utopianism could be said to constitute a ‘post-autistic politics’ to complement the ‘post-autistic economics’ movement, although it is worth noting that this has now changed its name to the ‘real world economics movement’ out of a well-grounded fear of appearing prejudiced. It would certainly be churlish to make any essentialist claims about the politics of those with autism, especially as there is not a scrap of evidence to suggest they are more likely to be politically conservative. As a metaphor for a culturally masculine lack of imagination, I am inclined to think the term has currency, however.

23 This point hinges on the translation used. I quote Clarence Brown, whose translation is used in this essay, but who uses archangel rather than Guardian angel. In his translator’s note he writes that “archangels”… [is what we find] in the available Russian text, though both [the] Zilboorg and Cauvet-Duhamel [translations] have the more plausible “Guardian Angels” (1993: 226).
24 As Talking Heads might say, ‘heaven is a place where nothing ever happens’.

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As I argued above that the anti-utopian/utopian binary is a double-bind, so we find citizens of OneState are enthusiastic utopians, embracing the principles of OneState and believing it to be ‘perfect’ (ibid.: 4). It is, for them, a realised utopia. Yet they are also committed anti-utopians, arguing- as the Guardian S does - that ‘we have nowhere to fly to, we’ve already flown there, we’ve found it’ (88) and writing - as D-503 does - that ‘only the four rules of arithmetic are unalterable and everlasting. And only that moral system built on the four rules [the moral system of OneState] will prevail as great, unalterable, and everlasting… that is the summit of the pyramid up which people, red and sweating, kicking and panting, have scrambled for centuries’ (111). Utopia has realized itself as the greatest anti-utopianism of all.

Yet this does not mean that We is an anti-utopian text. It portrays an anti-utopian society, but this is not quite the same thing25. Rather, most readers will find We a dystopian text, but as Sargent points out the conflation of the terms dystopia and anti-utopia is inaccurate - dystopias are rather works ‘that use the utopian form to attack either utopias in general or a specific utopia’ (1994: 8). We, I suggest, is a dystopia attacking State Utopianism; but it also contains a utopianism of its own: a nomadic utopianism.

**Nomadic Utopianism**

Here, I consider the tradition of utopianism orientated around freedom, arguing that its resonances with the thought of Deleuze and Zamyatin can lead to a creative encounter and the creation of a ‘nomadic utopianism’. Utopianism orientated around freedom rejects the idea of utopia as a once-and-for-all political act bringing about a perfect state of being (Sargent, 1994: 9). Rather, utopianism is an act of ‘social

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25 Here I am echoing a point Tony Burns makes in relation to The Dispossesed, which he argues is a novel set in a utopia rather than a utopia per se (2008: 264).
dreaming’ (Sargent, 1994; Levitas, 1990: 12) which permanently looks to go beyond the present- a view perhaps most famously expressed by Oscar Wilde: ‘A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at, for it leaves out the one country at which Humanity is always landing. And when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and, seeing a better country, sets sail. Progress is the realisation of Utopias’ (1891: online at flag.blackened.net)26.

Darko Suvin, meanwhile, invokes Umberto Eco’s definition of a semiotic encyclopedia in order to explain the tradition: ‘It appears not as a finished object but rather as an open project: not a utopia as terminus ad quem, i.e. a state of perfection to be reached, but a utopia as a regulating idea, as a project ante quem, whose force stems precisely from the fact that it cannot and should not be realized in any definitive form’. (1997: 134)

At its most radical, this tradition of utopianism argues that the authoritarian tradition is hostile for life, for perfection ‘symbolizes death: the death of movement, the death of progress and process, development and change; the death, in other words, of politics. To strive for perfection is to strive for death’ (Sargisson, 1994: 37). Rationally constructed perfection can no longer be the guide for utopia, which must instead ground itself in what Ben Anderson calls ‘an explicit ethos of hope’ (2006: 691); drawing on ‘irrational’ impulses to ‘go beyond the present’ (ibid.: 693). Yet this is a pessimistic hope - bound by the knowledge that every utopia will be a failure and - as soon as it declares itself a utopia - will slip into an anti-utopian state of being, denying further flows of life - a ‘metonymy of utopianism’. Hence Jameson’s

26 Influenced by the work of Ernst Bloch and postmodern critiques, later theorists in this utopian tradition reject notions of ‘progress’, arguing that they constitute only a repetition of contemporary society’s values and thus lack what Bloch calls the ‘novum’ - the ‘genuinely new’ required to make a society utopian.
assertion that utopian thought succeeds by failure (1982: 153); Tom Moylan’s concepts of the ‘critical utopia’ and the ‘critical dystopia’ which stand ‘against those who invoke the “end of history”… and find new directions for critical comparisons between what is and what is coming to be, where we are and what we might be doing’ (Moylan, 2000: 27) and Ursula K. Le Guin’s claim that ‘utopia is uninhabitable. As soon as we reach it, it ceases to be utopia. As evidence of this sad but ineluctable fact, may I point out that we in this room, here and now, are inhabiting a utopia’ (1989: 81). This is a useful quote, for it highlights the problematic nature of the site of utopia for those who see utopianism as a movement rejecting perfection. For Le Guin, utopia is - as Deleuze and Guattari tell us - now here and nowhere. Today’s world is yesterday’s utopia; but it contains within it immanent forces which will come to constitute tomorrow’s utopia. This leads some utopian scholars to reimagine utopia as a process, rather than a place (Jameson, 1982; Buchanan, 1998).

Given this turn away from perfection, I would argue that when Tormey and Townshend state Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy demands a ‘flight from…utopian schemas’, they are talking of what I have called State Utopianism. Indeed, I would argue that this nomadic flight - if enacted in practice- would itself constitute a utopianism- an immanent, nomadic movement opening up spaces for active life and allowing the creation of the new without reference to a transcendent ideal or lack: a nomadic utopianism.

Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s claims about the relationship between an object and the forces which produce that object, it remains impossible to separate the utopia from the utopianism which produced it, and which seeks to go beyond it:

27 This essay was originally delivered as a lecture, hence the phrasing.
'desire and its object are one and the same thing...hence the product is something removed or deducted from the process of producing: between the act of producing and the product, something becomes detached, thus giving the vagabond, nomad subject a residuum...Lack is a countereffect of desire' (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 28).

The nomadic utopia, then, is both a place and a process: it cannot be separated from the forces of nomadic utopianism that constitute it and act immanently to it to disrupt its operation; it is what is 'separated' from the forces which produce it - but never wholly - it is constantly being deterritorialized by further immanent, utopian forces.\(^{28}\)

**Nomadic Utopianism in We**

To conclude this paper, I return to Yevgeny Zamyatin’s *We*. Above, I argued that OneState constitutes a State Utopia: a striated space occupied by apparently rational subjects who participate in a philosophy hostile to life, leading to traditional readings of *We* as an anti-utopian text. These, I contend are hasty—*We* is dystopian, but at the same time it contains a nomadic utopianism in the form of the Mephi resistance movement. Analysing their philosophy provides this paper with a fictional example to flesh out the theory of nomadic utopianism developed above.

The Mephi, I argue, constitute a ‘nomadic war machine’. They are truly ‘outside’ the state form - many of them live outside the ‘Green Wall’ which surrounds OneState - and they seek to deterritorialize OneState’s striated space. They reject the idea that perfection is possible yet have not abandoned the hope of achieving radical political change.

\(^{28}\) Unfortunately, there is little room to elaborate on this claim in relation to *We*. For a discussion, see my paper arguing that the spaces created by improvised music constitute a nomadic utopia (author, forthcoming).
The Mephi’s main mouthpiece in *We* is I-330, a female acquaintance of D-503’s. She rejects OneState’s claims to be a perfected end of history and forces D-503 to reconsider his own ‘rational’ position. Her philosophy is powered by the same immanent, inorganic vitalism as Zamyatin’s *On Literature, Revolution, Entropy and Other Matters*, clearly demonstrated when she explains to D-503 that:

> there are two forces in the world, entropy and energy. One of them leads to blissful tranquility, to happy equilibrium. The other leads to the disruption of equilibrium, to the torment of perpetual movement. Our - or rather, your - ancestors, the Christians, worshipped entropy as they worshipped God. But we anti-Christians, we… (Zamyatin, 1993: 159)

The Mephi’s philosophy, therefore, is one of opening up spaces for life; of creating perpetual movement and preventing entropic forces reintroducing the transcendent by stopping the movement of the infinite. This is made clear in what is perhaps the book’s pivotal exchange, where I-330 lays bare the fallacy of hoping for a final state of being to D-503:

> “Yes- revolution! Why is that stupid?”

> “Stupid- because there can’t be a revolution. Because… our revolution was the final one. And there cannot be any further revolutions of any kind. Everybody knows that.”

> … “Tell me the final number.”

> “The what? I… I don’t understand. What final number?”

> “You know - the last one, the t

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29 Although there is not room for such a reading in this paper, it would be worthwhile to undertake a feminist analysis of *We*. In making I-330 a female, Zamyatin seems to be agreeing with Sargisson - who argues that the utopian figure is culturally (if not necessarily biologically) female (1994: 31). There are also strong links between I-330 and Eve (with D-503 as Adam and OneState as the Garden of Eden), bringing to mind feminist calls to reclaim Eve as a positive figure (see the interview with suffragette Mrs Henry M. Burton in *New York Times*: 1914, for an example of such thought contemporaneous to Zamyatin).

30 A knock on the door interrupts the conversation at this point, hence the tailing off. The oft-noted influence of Nietzsche on Zamyatin (see Burns, 2000) is apparent here with the reference to ‘Anti-Christians’ in this extract. Nietzsche was, of course, also an enormous influence on the philosophy of Deleuze.
op, the absolute biggest."

“But, I-330, that’s stupid. Since the number of numbers is infinite, how can there be a final one? And how can there be a final revolution? There is no final one. The number of revolutions is infinite.” (Zamyatin, 1993: 168).

D-503 finds that his rational certainty is eroded by I-330. He develops a fascination with √-1: an ‘irrational’ number which troubles him greatly, eventually sparking a hint of nomadic utopianism as he considers the possibility of immanent utopian forces lurking in the present:

For every equation, ever formula in the superficial world, there is a corresponding curve or solid. For irrational formulas, for my √-1, we know of no corresponding solids, we’ve never seen them. . . But that’s just the whole horror- that these solids, invisible, exist. They absolutely inescapably must exist. Because in mathematics their eccentric prickly shadows, the irrational formulas, parade in front of our eyes as if they were on a screen. And mathematics and death never make a mistake. And if we don’t see these solids in our surface world, there is for them, there inevitably must be, a whole immense world there, beneath the surface… My mathematics, up to now the only lasting and immovable island in my entire dislocated life, had also broken loose and floated whirling off.’ (Zamyatin, 1993: 98)

Here, the text fulfils the function Jameson identifies of science fiction: hinting at other, unimaginable potential worlds, latent in the present (Jameson, 1982). This ‘descent’ into irrational thinking moves D-503 closer to what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘schizophrenia’: he is no longer the rational, self-identical subject of the Cogito, describing himself as suffering from a ‘strange condition… [where] you wake up at night, open your eyes on the darkness, and suddenly feel – you’re lost, and you start groping around as fast as you can, looking for something familiar and solid…” (Zamyatin, 1993: 143).

He also comes to see an ‘other’ in himself, finding that he is often not alone but ‘with “him”, the other me’ (ibid: 63). This ‘other’ D-503 is an irrational being whose ‘shell

31 There is a clear link here to Lyotard’s claim that science produces the unknown and thus demands a new politics (May, 93).
burst open, and… [whose] pieces were just about to fly in all directions… and then what?’ (ibid: 56). D-503 comes to embrace this irrational other, even going so far as to declare that ‘everybody has to go mad… absolutely mad, and as soon as possible! This is crucial! I know it is!’ (ibid.: 152). He becomes a schizo-revolutionary; joins the Mephi and embraces their nomadic aim of deterritorialising OneState’s Euclidean, striated space by ‘demolishing all walls’ (ibid: 151).32

The Mephi, then, enable us to visualize a nomadic utopianism. They posit change that proceeds not from a rational subject who perceives a lack and designs a transcendent utopia to fill it, but from irrational, ‘schizophrenics’ whose utopianism creates its own utopia; whose raison d’être is ‘just to fly, not knowing, no matter where...’ (ibid: 193) and who argue that what will come will be ‘new, never before seen, or imagined’ (ibid: 141). It will not, however, be perfect.

Conclusion

This paper has creatively read three varied bodies of political philosophy, forcing them to speak and identifying resonances between them. This resonance has been christened ‘nomadic utopianism’ and it is to be hoped that this shed new light on all three bodies of thought.

I have suggested that Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s nomadic thought constitutes a utopianism, albeit of a kind hostile to colloquial definitions of the term. By seeking to open up spaces for life, it posits an eternal movement of becoming, or deterritorialisation (utopianism) - a flight from forces which seek to contain life; a

32 In the context of the novel’s narrative, these walls refer not only to metaphoric walls in thought, but also to the ‘Green Wall’ which separates OneState from the wilds beyond.
movement which ‘links political philosophy with its own epoch’, but works on behalf of people yet to come. It is also hoped that by using *We* to provide fictive illustrations for many of Deleuze and Guattari’s difficult, neologistic concepts this paper may help provide a handle for their work.

Yevgeny Zamyatin, meanwhile, is shown to be a thinker with remarkable resonances to two bodies of political philosophy he predated by a considerable length of time, whilst readings of *We* as an anti-utopian text have been challenged.

Finally, I have suggested that contemporary utopian studies is an area which can benefit from encounters with the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. I have sought to highlight areas where the two philosophies converge and suggested that Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the relationship between desire and its product offer a new way of theorising the relationship between utopia and utopianism.

Above and beyond this, however, this paper has suggested a ‘nomadic utopianism’ for those seeking to open new spaces for life - a philosophy which, by suggesting that the good place immediately begins to ossify into a bad place, restores the original etymological schizophrenia of the term utopia- ‘the good place that is no place’.
Bibliography


